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Full Idea
Philosophers' zombies (invented by Robert Kirk) differ from the zombies of folklore; they are intended to make clear the idea that consciousness is an addition of being, something 'over and above' the physical world.
Clarification
A zombie is a human that lacks consciousness
Gist of Idea
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.1 n1)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.241
A Reaction
The famous defender of zombies is David Chalmers. You can't believe in zombies if you believe (as I do) that 'the physical entails the mental'. Could there be redness without something that is red? If consciousness is extra, what is conscious?
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |