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Single Idea 7063

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies ]

Full Idea

The possibility of zombies is founded on the idea that consciousness is related contingently to physical states and processes.

Clarification

'Contingent' means 'doesn't have to occur'

Gist of Idea

Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical

Source

John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.3)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.243


A Reaction

The question is, how do you decide whether the relationship is contingent or necessary? Hence the interest in whether conceivability entails possibility. Kripke attacks the idea of contingent identity, pointing towards necessity, and away from zombies.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [possible complete human, but lacking awareness]:

It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]