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Full Idea
Functionalists deny that zombies are possible since states of mind (including conscious states) are purely functional states. If two agents are in the same functional state, regardless of qualitative difference, they are in the same mental state.
Gist of Idea
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.5)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.247
A Reaction
In its 'brief' form this idea begins to smell of tautology. Only the right sort of functional state would entail a mental state, and how else can that functional state be defined, apart from its leading to a mental state?
12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |