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Single Idea 7065

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism ]

Full Idea

Anti-realist philosophers, and those who hope to reduce metaphysics to (or replace it with) the philosophy of language, owe the rest of us an account of the ontology of language.

Clarification

The 'ontology' here concerns whether language itself exists

Gist of Idea

Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language

Source

John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.6)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.249


A Reaction

A nice turning-the-tables question. In all accounts of relativism, x is usually said to be relative to y. You haven't got proper relativism if you haven't relativised both x and y. But relativised them to what? Nietzsche's 'perspectivism' (Idea 4420)?

Related Idea

Idea 4420 There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]


The 36 ideas with the same theme [either denial of external reality, or of its having knowable structure]:

For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant]
Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant]
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg]
People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran]
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA]
Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker]
We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker]
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W]