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Single Idea 7088

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic ]

Full Idea

Neither logical nor mathematical propositions say anything about the world, because in virtue of their always being true they are consistent with any way the world could happen to be.

Gist of Idea

Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities

Source

report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2

Book Ref

Grayling,A.C.: 'Wittgenstein' [OUP 2001], p.38


A Reaction

This became the standard view for twentieth century empiricists, and appeared to rule out a priori synthetic knowledge forever. Kripke's proposal that there are a posteriori necessities, however, changes the picture.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [a priori knowledge comes from the meanings of words]:

A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant]
Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz]
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]