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Single Idea 7089
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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Full Idea
A name means an object; an object is its meaning. ...A name cannot be dissected further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.
Gist of Idea
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 3.203/3.26)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.12
A Reaction
This is the optimistic view of names, that they are the point at which language plugs into the world (Russell preferred demonstratives for that job). Kripke's baptismal view of names has the same aspiration.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[names do no more than pick out an object]:
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13789
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Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing
[Plato]
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4944
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Mill says names have denotation but not connotation
[Mill, by Kripke]
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7762
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Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object
[Mill, by Lycan]
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4978
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The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
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6410
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The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
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10449
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Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
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15159
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The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
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10823
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A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
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7089
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A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
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21879
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Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
[Derrida]
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9171
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The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
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10428
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Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
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8957
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Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
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4959
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A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
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16982
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A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
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16405
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To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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7306
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If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
[Miller,A]
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
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18945
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Millians say a name just means its object
[Sawyer]
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