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Single Idea 7112

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique ]

Full Idea

We must remember that all authors who have described the Cogito have presented it as a reflective operation, i.e. as second-order. This Cogito is performed by a consciousness directed towards consciousness, which takes consciousness as its object.

Gist of Idea

The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness

Source

Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))

Book Ref

Sartre,Jean-Paul: 'The Transcendence of the Ego' [Routledge 2004], p.10


A Reaction

Sartre is raising the nice question of whether the Cogito still works for first-order consciousness, which attends totally to external objects. He claims that it doesn't. Contrast Russell, who says (Idea 5380) that it only works when it is first-order!

Related Idea

Idea 5380 In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]


The 21 ideas from 'Transcendence of the Ego'

Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]