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Single Idea 7132

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis ]

Full Idea

The last thing to dawn on philosophers is that they must no longer merely let themselves be given concepts, no longer just clean and clarify them, but first of all must make them, create them, present them and persuade in their favour.

Gist of Idea

Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 34[195])

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Writings from the Late Notebooks', ed/tr. Bittner,Rüdiger [CUP 2003], p.12


A Reaction

Compare the disagreement between Wittgenstein (Idea 2937) and Keith Ansell Pearson (Idea 6870). The trouble is that now every book you read is creating new concepts, which usually fail to catch on. I agree, though, with Nietzsche.

Related Ideas

Idea 2937 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]

Idea 6870 I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]


The 28 ideas with the same theme [analysis concentrating on contents and source of concepts]:

It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant]
Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant]
Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant]
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege]
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]