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Full Idea
I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement.
Gist of Idea
Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.418
A Reaction
I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition.
| 7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
| 7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
| 7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
| 7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |