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Single Idea 7296

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem ]

Full Idea

'Grue' is not a colour.

Gist of Idea

'Grue' is not a colour

Source

Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)

A Reaction

This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [problem of a predicate which changes over time]:

17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
5485 Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
15887 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
15888 The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
4783 Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
14989 Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
14997 Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]