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Full Idea
Linguistic phenomenalism argues that it is possible to remove all talk of physical objects from our speech with no loss of meaning.
Gist of Idea
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects
Source
Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Cardinal/Hayward/Jones: 'Epistemology: the theory of knowledge' [John Murray 2004], p.114
A Reaction
I find this proposal unappealing. My basic objection is that I cannot understand why anyone would refuse to even contemplate the question of WHY I am having a given group of consistent experiences, of (say) a table kind.
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |