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Full Idea
The problem with taking sense-data as basic is that some data can appear indeterminate. If we can't discern the colour of someone's eyes, or the number of sides of a complex figure, are we to say that there is no fact about those things?
Gist of Idea
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'?
Source
Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Cardinal/Hayward/Jones: 'Epistemology: the theory of knowledge' [John Murray 2004], p.119
A Reaction
I like that. How many electrons are there in the sun? Such things cannot just be reduced to talk of sense-data, as there is obviously a vast gap between the data and the facts. As usual, ontology and epistemology must be kept separate.
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |