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Single Idea 7304

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Frege analysed the intuitive notion of meaning in terms of the notions of sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone.

Gist of Idea

Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892], Pref) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language Pref

Book Ref

Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.-8


A Reaction

This suggests that there are two approaches to the explanation of meaning: either a simple identity with some other mental fact, or an analysis (as here) into a range of components. I remain open-minded on that.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]