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Single Idea 7307
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
]
Full Idea
For Frege, a thought is not something psychological or subjective; rather, it is objective in the sense that it specifies some condition in the world the obtaining of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of the sentence that expresses it.
Gist of Idea
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.2
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.33
A Reaction
It is worth emphasising Russell's anti-Berkeley point about 'ideas', that the idea is in the mind, but its contents are in the world. Since the contents are what matter, this endorses Frege, and also points towards modern externalism.
The
26 ideas
from 'works'
13473
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Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover
[Frege, by Hart,WD]
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3319
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Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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6076
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For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False
[Frege, by McGinn]
|
9871
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Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification
[Dummett on Frege]
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16884
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Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood
[Frege, by Burge]
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3331
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If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content
[Benardete,JA on Frege]
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16880
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Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements
[Frege, by Burge]
|
5657
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Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being
[Frege, by Scruton]
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3318
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Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x'
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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16885
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To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts
[Frege, by Burge]
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16887
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Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds
[Frege, by Burge]
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16894
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An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification
[Frege, by Burge]
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3307
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Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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16882
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The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline
[Frege]
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5816
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Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities
[Frege, by Putnam]
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7307
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A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
7309
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Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone
[Frege, by Miller,A]
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7312
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'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness
[Frege, by Miller,A]
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7725
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'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate
[Frege, by Weiner]
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7316
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Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions
[Frege, by Miller,A]
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13455
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Frege did not think of himself as working with sets
[Frege, by Hart,WD]
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16895
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The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing
[Frege, by Burge]
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3328
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Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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8689
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Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic
[Frege, by Friend]
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22317
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Truth does not admit of more and less
[Frege]
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9179
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Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language
[Frege, by Dummett]
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