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Single Idea 7310
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
]
Full Idea
Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names.
Gist of Idea
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.60
A Reaction
Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')?
The
581 ideas
from Bertrand Russell
6410
|
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6417
|
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6474
|
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour
[Russell]
|
6476
|
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data
[Russell]
|
6475
|
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar
[Russell]
|
2792
|
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories
[Russell]
|
22326
|
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate
[Russell]
|
21706
|
At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
6418
|
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6402
|
In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
14732
|
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre
[Russell]
|
14733
|
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
23154
|
We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other
[Russell]
|
23153
|
Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality
[Russell]
|
23152
|
Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear
[Russell]
|
23151
|
A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups
[Russell]
|
23155
|
In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey
[Russell]
|
23156
|
The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit
[Russell]
|
23157
|
Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires
[Russell]
|
23158
|
Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker
[Russell]
|
23161
|
Slaves can be just as equal as free people
[Russell]
|
23159
|
Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution
[Russell]
|
23162
|
Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism
[Russell]
|
23160
|
Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot
[Russell]
|
23168
|
A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses
[Russell]
|
23165
|
Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade
[Russell]
|
23164
|
Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert
[Russell]
|
23167
|
Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers
[Russell]
|
23163
|
In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible
[Russell]
|
23166
|
In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government
[Russell]
|
20176
|
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power
[Russell]
|
20178
|
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening
[Russell]
|
20179
|
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this
[Russell]
|
20177
|
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied
[Russell]
|
20180
|
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life
[Russell]
|
10052
|
Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry
[Russell, by Musgrave]
|
10053
|
Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true
[Russell]
|
2609
|
If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees
[Russell]
|
4786
|
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants
[Russell, by Psillos]
|
16491
|
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts
[Russell]
|
16488
|
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation
[Russell]
|
16490
|
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities
[Russell]
|
16489
|
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'?
[Russell]
|
16479
|
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs
[Russell]
|
16481
|
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world
[Russell]
|
16487
|
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic
[Russell]
|
16480
|
A disjunction expresses indecision
[Russell]
|
16486
|
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does
[Russell]
|
16483
|
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory.
[Russell]
|
16477
|
Asserting not-p is saying p is false
[Russell]
|
16484
|
There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things
[Russell]
|
16475
|
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no!
[Russell]
|
16482
|
All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words
[Russell]
|
16476
|
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true
[Russell]
|
16485
|
Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism?
[Russell]
|
16478
|
A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens
[Russell]
|
2947
|
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle
[Russell]
|
4758
|
Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false
[Russell]
|
21563
|
The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members
[Russell]
|
21564
|
Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL
[Russell]
|
21565
|
Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined
[Russell]
|
13414
|
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets
[Russell, by Benacerraf]
|
8469
|
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions
[Russell, by Orenstein]
|
8468
|
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false
[Russell, by Orenstein]
|
14420
|
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics
[Russell]
|
8745
|
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world
[Russell]
|
14424
|
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties
[Russell]
|
14421
|
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult
[Russell]
|
14422
|
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms
[Russell]
|
14423
|
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms
[Russell]
|
14425
|
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size
[Russell]
|
14428
|
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous
[Russell]
|
14427
|
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes
[Russell]
|
14426
|
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property
[Russell]
|
14430
|
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive
[Russell]
|
14429
|
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics
[Russell]
|
14431
|
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms
[Russell]
|
14441
|
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive
[Russell]
|
10450
|
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions
[Russell, by Bach]
|
13510
|
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression?
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
14432
|
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a
[Russell]
|
14435
|
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
14433
|
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them?
[Russell]
|
14434
|
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature
[Russell]
|
14438
|
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations
[Russell]
|
14436
|
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum
[Russell]
|
14439
|
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers
[Russell]
|
14440
|
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them
[Russell]
|
14442
|
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common
[Russell]
|
14443
|
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency
[Russell]
|
14445
|
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater
[Russell]
|
14444
|
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered
[Russell]
|
14446
|
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class
[Russell]
|
14447
|
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms'
[Russell]
|
14449
|
There is always something psychological about inference
[Russell]
|
12197
|
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true
[Russell]
|
14450
|
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions
[Russell]
|
14451
|
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts
[Russell]
|
14453
|
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M?
[Russell]
|
14454
|
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true
[Russell]
|
14452
|
All the propositions of logic are completely general
[Russell]
|
12444
|
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology
[Russell]
|
14458
|
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description
[Russell]
|
14456
|
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity
[Russell]
|
14457
|
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that'
[Russell]
|
7311
|
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that'
[Russell]
|
14455
|
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not
[Russell]
|
14460
|
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary
[Russell]
|
14461
|
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions
[Russell]
|
14459
|
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function
[Russell]
|
14464
|
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world
[Russell]
|
14462
|
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical
[Russell]
|
10057
|
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence
[Russell]
|
14463
|
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named
[Russell]
|
14465
|
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men'
[Russell]
|
21570
|
Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away
[Russell]
|
8854
|
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York
[Williams,M on Russell]
|
21710
|
We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'
[Russell]
|
21571
|
Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy
[Russell]
|
21572
|
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other
[Russell]
|
21573
|
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all
[Russell]
|
21576
|
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible
[Russell]
|
21575
|
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group
[Russell]
|
21577
|
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality
[Russell]
|
21574
|
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors
[Russell]
|
21578
|
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate
[Russell]
|
6416
|
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
21579
|
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way
[Russell]
|
21581
|
We never experience times, but only succession of events
[Russell]
|
21580
|
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them
[Russell]
|
21582
|
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics
[Russell]
|
21583
|
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process
[Russell]
|
21584
|
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom
[Russell]
|
21585
|
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time
[Russell]
|
21586
|
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context
[Russell]
|
21588
|
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy
[Russell]
|
21587
|
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system
[Russell]
|
21684
|
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts
[Russell]
|
22316
|
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive
[Russell]
|
10968
|
Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions
[Russell, by Read]
|
6107
|
It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy
[Russell]
|
6108
|
Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations
[Russell]
|
6109
|
Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions
[Russell]
|
6110
|
Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages
[Russell]
|
6111
|
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form
[Russell]
|
6112
|
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types
[Russell]
|
6113
|
To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them
[Russell]
|
6114
|
'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis
[Russell]
|
6115
|
Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language
[Russell]
|
6116
|
A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language
[Russell]
|
6117
|
Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error
[Russell]
|
21722
|
Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown
[Russell]
|
6118
|
Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis
[Russell]
|
10059
|
In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth
[Russell]
|
7554
|
Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp
[Russell]
|
7556
|
A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number
[Russell]
|
7557
|
To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts
[Russell]
|
21532
|
Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential
[Russell]
|
21533
|
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer
[Russell]
|
21534
|
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate
[Russell]
|
21535
|
Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time
[Russell]
|
21536
|
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing
[Russell]
|
21537
|
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations'
[Russell]
|
21538
|
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind
[Russell]
|
21539
|
Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p
[Russell]
|
21540
|
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation
[Russell]
|
21541
|
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object
[Russell]
|
21542
|
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects?
[Russell]
|
21543
|
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist
[Russell]
|
21544
|
It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist
[Russell]
|
21531
|
Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true
[Lackey on Russell]
|
21545
|
I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting
[Russell]
|
21546
|
We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us
[Russell]
|
21547
|
On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist
[Russell]
|
21550
|
Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters
[Russell]
|
21551
|
Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric
[Russell]
|
21552
|
Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision
[Russell]
|
6420
|
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy
[Russell]
|
6419
|
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism
[Russell]
|
6426
|
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it
[Russell]
|
7528
|
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
[Russell]
|
6423
|
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts
[Russell]
|
6424
|
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess
[Russell]
|
6425
|
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion
[Russell]
|
6427
|
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false
[Russell]
|
6430
|
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds
[Russell]
|
6431
|
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience'
[Russell]
|
6432
|
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have
[Russell]
|
6434
|
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities
[Russell]
|
6433
|
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images
[Russell]
|
6435
|
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
|
6440
|
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals
[Russell]
|
6438
|
Complex things can be known, but not simple things
[Russell]
|
6439
|
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
[Russell]
|
6437
|
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate
[Russell]
|
6436
|
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience
[Russell]
|
6442
|
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
|
6441
|
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes
[Russell]
|
6444
|
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
[Russell]
|
6443
|
Surprise is a criterion of error
[Russell]
|
4396
|
The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy
[Russell]
|
8375
|
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument
[Russell]
|
8376
|
If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling
[Russell]
|
8378
|
Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science
[Russell]
|
8379
|
In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars
[Russell]
|
8380
|
Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work
[Russell]
|
8381
|
The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect
[Russell]
|
11006
|
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions
[Read on Russell]
|
18944
|
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F)
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
18941
|
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
15159
|
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
|
7758
|
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
4945
|
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
18942
|
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
7745
|
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?
[McCullogh on Russell]
|
2612
|
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates
[Russell, by Ayer]
|
7757
|
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
6061
|
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier
[Russell, by McGinn]
|
6411
|
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
|
10433
|
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
10449
|
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
|
18943
|
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
1608
|
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed
[Russell, by Quine]
|
7754
|
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
21529
|
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic
[Russell, by Lackey]
|
6333
|
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic
[Russell, by Horwich]
|
6412
|
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique
[Grayling on Russell]
|
7743
|
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
7310
|
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
12006
|
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems
[Russell, by Forbes,G]
|
4569
|
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
11009
|
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false
[Read on Russell]
|
21549
|
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers
[Lackey on Russell]
|
12796
|
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars
[Laycock on Russell]
|
7532
|
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes
[Russell, by Monk]
|
11988
|
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description
[Kaplan on Russell]
|
18777
|
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle
[Linsky,B on Russell]
|
6063
|
Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
|
18775
|
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
7533
|
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals
[Russell, by Monk]
|
16385
|
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
4567
|
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
5810
|
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions
[Donnellan on Russell]
|
16987
|
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense'
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
7767
|
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
16349
|
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
7313
|
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent)
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
4570
|
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions
[Cooper,DE on Russell]
|
5772
|
The idea of a variable is fundamental
[Russell]
|
5774
|
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions
[Russell]
|
5775
|
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different
[Russell]
|
5773
|
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..'
[Russell]
|
21726
|
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
5779
|
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
|
5778
|
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches
[Russell]
|
5781
|
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions
[Russell]
|
5782
|
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition'
[Russell]
|
5780
|
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character
[Russell]
|
5784
|
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs
[Russell]
|
5783
|
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky
[Russell]
|
5777
|
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'
[Russell]
|
5776
|
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely
[Russell]
|
22891
|
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement
[Russell, by Bardon]
|
21741
|
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval
[Russell]
|
21746
|
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love
[Russell]
|
21747
|
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge
[Russell]
|
21743
|
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose
[Russell]
|
21742
|
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom
[Russell]
|
21744
|
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires
[Russell]
|
21745
|
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires
[Russell]
|
21740
|
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy
[Russell]
|
22306
|
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing
[Russell]
|
22308
|
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis
[Russell]
|
22307
|
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact
[Russell]
|
21702
|
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
[Russell, by Quine]
|
9022
|
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes
[Quine on Russell]
|
6060
|
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
|
18348
|
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers
[Russell, by Rami]
|
7744
|
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
18376
|
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts
[Russell, by Armstrong]
|
5465
|
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states
[Russell, by Ellis]
|
21708
|
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions)
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
19051
|
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data
[Russell, by Quine]
|
6089
|
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis
[Russell]
|
6090
|
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences
[Russell]
|
6091
|
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
[Russell]
|
6093
|
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared
[Russell]
|
6092
|
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object
[Russell]
|
6095
|
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
[Russell]
|
6094
|
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
[Russell]
|
6096
|
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods
[Russell]
|
6097
|
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent
[Russell]
|
6098
|
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition
[Russell]
|
6099
|
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions
[Russell]
|
6100
|
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts
[Russell]
|
6119
|
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name
[Russell]
|
6101
|
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'
[Russell]
|
6102
|
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
[Russell]
|
6103
|
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical
[Russell]
|
6106
|
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely
[Russell]
|
6105
|
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality
[Russell]
|
6104
|
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions
[Russell]
|
10423
|
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
10426
|
A name has got to name something or it is not a name
[Russell]
|
21712
|
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday
[Russell]
|
21709
|
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert
[Russell]
|
23169
|
Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy
[Russell]
|
23170
|
Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence
[Russell]
|
23172
|
Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness
[Russell]
|
23171
|
Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred
[Russell]
|
22329
|
Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality
[Russell, by Glock]
|
21569
|
It is good to generalise truths as much as possible
[Russell]
|
7529
|
All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions
[Russell]
|
21520
|
That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life
[Russell]
|
21495
|
Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals
[Russell]
|
21522
|
Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution
[Russell]
|
21517
|
Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect
[Russell]
|
21521
|
Anarchy does not maximise liberty
[Russell]
|
21518
|
Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty
[Russell]
|
21523
|
We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament
[Russell]
|
21519
|
We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity
[Russell]
|
21524
|
The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income
[Russell]
|
21525
|
When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people
[Russell]
|
21528
|
Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator
[Russell]
|
21527
|
On every new question the majority is always wrong at first
[Russell]
|
21526
|
Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity
[Russell]
|
21681
|
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced
[Russell]
|
11010
|
Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought
[Russell]
|
7530
|
Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class'
[Russell, by Monk]
|
15895
|
Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work
[Russell, by Lavine]
|
18254
|
Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8
[Russell, by Dummett]
|
15894
|
Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor
[Russell, by Lavine]
|
18722
|
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation
[Wittgenstein on Russell]
|
11849
|
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common
[Wittgenstein on Russell]
|
19164
|
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable
[Davidson on Russell]
|
14102
|
What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions'
[Russell]
|
14103
|
Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q'
[Russell]
|
14104
|
Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous
[Russell]
|
14105
|
There seem to be eight or nine logical constants
[Russell]
|
14106
|
Implication cannot be defined
[Russell]
|
14107
|
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes
[Russell]
|
14108
|
It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication
[Russell]
|
14109
|
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy
[Russell]
|
7781
|
I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence.
[Russell]
|
14110
|
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves
[Russell]
|
14111
|
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it
[Russell]
|
14112
|
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole'
[Russell]
|
14113
|
The null class is a fiction
[Russell]
|
14114
|
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions
[Russell]
|
14115
|
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole
[Russell]
|
14116
|
Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and +
[Russell]
|
14117
|
Numbers are properties of classes
[Russell]
|
14118
|
We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity
[Russell]
|
14119
|
We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other
[Russell]
|
14120
|
Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic
[Russell]
|
14121
|
The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable
[Russell]
|
14122
|
Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth
[Russell]
|
14123
|
Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable
[Russell]
|
10583
|
Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation
[Russell]
|
10582
|
The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity
[Russell]
|
10584
|
A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation
[Russell]
|
14124
|
Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater
[Russell]
|
14125
|
Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction
[Russell]
|
14126
|
Order rests on 'between' and 'separation'
[Russell]
|
14127
|
Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations
[Russell]
|
10585
|
Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality
[Russell]
|
10586
|
'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness
[Russell]
|
14128
|
Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them
[Russell]
|
14129
|
Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one
[Russell]
|
9977
|
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities
[Russell]
|
14132
|
Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic
[Russell]
|
14133
|
There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal)
[Russell]
|
14134
|
Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole
[Russell]
|
14135
|
Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all)
[Russell]
|
14137
|
'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned
[Russell]
|
14138
|
You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it
[Russell]
|
14140
|
For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals
[Russell]
|
14141
|
Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction
[Russell]
|
14142
|
Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance
[Russell]
|
14139
|
Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic
[Russell]
|
14143
|
ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers
[Russell]
|
14144
|
Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes
[Russell]
|
14145
|
For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers
[Russell]
|
14146
|
We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another
[Russell]
|
14147
|
Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite
[Russell]
|
14149
|
The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes
[Russell]
|
14148
|
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing
[Russell]
|
14151
|
Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists
[Russell]
|
14153
|
In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience
[Russell]
|
14152
|
In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses
[Russell]
|
14154
|
Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space
[Russell]
|
14155
|
Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective)
[Russell, by PG]
|
14156
|
Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line
[Russell]
|
14158
|
Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order
[Russell]
|
14159
|
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives
[Russell]
|
14160
|
Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry
[Russell]
|
14161
|
Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence
[Russell]
|
22303
|
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false
[Russell]
|
14162
|
Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist
[Russell]
|
14163
|
Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points
[Russell]
|
14164
|
The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts
[Russell]
|
14166
|
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity
[Russell]
|
14165
|
Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum
[Russell]
|
14167
|
The only classes are things, predicates and relations
[Russell]
|
14168
|
Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times
[Russell]
|
14169
|
The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist
[Russell]
|
14170
|
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences
[Russell]
|
14171
|
Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction
[Russell]
|
14172
|
Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them
[Russell]
|
14173
|
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them
[Russell]
|
14174
|
The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter
[Russell]
|
14175
|
We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts
[Russell]
|
14176
|
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died"
[Russell]
|
21555
|
For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x
[Russell]
|
18002
|
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables
[Russell]
|
18003
|
In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless
[Russell, by Magidor]
|
21341
|
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential
[Russell, by Heil]
|
18246
|
Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions
[Shapiro on Russell]
|
19157
|
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible
[Russell, by Davidson]
|
21724
|
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
13468
|
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
6510
|
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
7290
|
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa
[Russell, by Thompson]
|
6514
|
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
6415
|
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
5358
|
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses
[Russell]
|
5357
|
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge
[Russell]
|
5359
|
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain
[Russell]
|
5362
|
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist
[Russell]
|
5363
|
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions
[Russell]
|
5367
|
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic
[Russell]
|
5364
|
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves
[Russell]
|
5365
|
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world
[Russell]
|
5366
|
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection
[Russell]
|
5361
|
Philosophers must get used to absurdities
[Russell]
|
5368
|
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent
[Russell]
|
5370
|
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them
[Russell]
|
5372
|
There is no reason to think that objects have colours
[Russell]
|
5371
|
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate
[Russell]
|
5369
|
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it
[Russell]
|
5375
|
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
|
5376
|
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted
[Russell]
|
5373
|
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental
[Russell]
|
5382
|
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals
[Russell, by PG]
|
5389
|
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience
[Russell]
|
5378
|
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
5379
|
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds
[Russell]
|
5383
|
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal
[Russell]
|
5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
5384
|
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
|
5381
|
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
[Russell]
|
5380
|
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data
[Russell]
|
5387
|
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
5386
|
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind
[Russell]
|
5393
|
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws
[Russell]
|
5388
|
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted
[Russell]
|
5391
|
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions
[Russell]
|
5394
|
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question
[Russell]
|
5390
|
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck
[Russell]
|
5392
|
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will
[Russell]
|
5398
|
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value
[Russell]
|
5397
|
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience
[Russell]
|
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
|
5395
|
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true
[Russell]
|
5396
|
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle
[Russell]
|
5401
|
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction
[Russell]
|
5399
|
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it
[Russell]
|
5405
|
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things
[Russell]
|
4428
|
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives)
[Russell]
|
5406
|
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals
[Russell]
|
4479
|
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all
[Russell, by Loux]
|
4427
|
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth
[Russell]
|
4030
|
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations)
[Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
5409
|
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist'
[Russell]
|
5408
|
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought
[Russell]
|
4441
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
|
4429
|
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality
[Russell]
|
5407
|
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals
[Russell]
|
4430
|
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals
[Russell]
|
5411
|
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given
[Russell]
|
5410
|
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red
[Russell]
|
5412
|
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident
[Russell]
|
5413
|
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles
[Russell]
|
5415
|
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees
[Russell]
|
5416
|
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct
[Russell]
|
5414
|
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past
[Russell]
|
5426
|
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself
[Russell]
|
21711
|
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
5427
|
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
|
5425
|
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two
[Russell]
|
5421
|
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth
[Russell]
|
7395
|
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence
[Joslin on Russell]
|
5428
|
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't
[Russell]
|
5419
|
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
|
5420
|
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
|
5422
|
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible
[Russell]
|
5423
|
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent
[Russell]
|
5424
|
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth
[Russell]
|
5417
|
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible
[Russell]
|
5418
|
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths
[Russell]
|
5431
|
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion'
[Russell]
|
5430
|
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning
[Russell]
|
5429
|
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief
[Russell]
|
5432
|
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole
[Russell]
|
5434
|
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom
[Russell]
|
17627
|
It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises
[Russell]
|
17628
|
Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects
[Russell]
|
17629
|
Which premises are ultimate varies with context
[Russell]
|
17630
|
The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion
[Russell]
|
17632
|
Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable
[Russell]
|
17631
|
Induction is inferring premises from consequences
[Russell]
|
17633
|
The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations
[Russell]
|
17637
|
The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict
[Russell]
|
17639
|
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions
[Russell]
|
17638
|
If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone
[Russell]
|
17640
|
Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results
[Russell]
|
17641
|
Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation
[Russell]
|
23025
|
Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence
[Russell]
|
6483
|
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
8244
|
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
|
6459
|
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data
[Russell]
|
6458
|
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to
[Russell]
|
6460
|
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind
[Russell]
|
6461
|
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands
[Russell]
|
6462
|
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
|
6463
|
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
6464
|
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
6470
|
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes
[Russell]
|
6465
|
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it
[Russell]
|
6466
|
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
[Russell]
|
6468
|
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives'
[Russell]
|
6467
|
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
|
6469
|
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them
[Russell]
|
6471
|
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate
[Russell]
|
6473
|
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws
[Russell]
|
6472
|
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid
[Russell]
|
18130
|
Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
21560
|
Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context
[Russell]
|
21561
|
'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless
[Russell]
|
21562
|
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth
[Russell]
|
22315
|
There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence
[Potter on Russell]
|
23476
|
Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form
[Russell]
|
23477
|
We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are
[Russell]
|
18273
|
Logical truths are known by their extreme generality
[Russell]
|
23457
|
Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules)
[Morris,M on Russell]
|
21556
|
Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility
[Russell, by Lackey]
|
21566
|
'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value
[Russell]
|
21567
|
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type
[Russell]
|
21568
|
A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments
[Russell]
|
18126
|
A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
18128
|
Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
21718
|
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
10418
|
Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous
[Swoyer on Russell]
|
10047
|
Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms
[Russell, by Musgrave]
|
23478
|
Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed
[Morris,M on Russell]
|
6407
|
The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
11064
|
Classes can be reduced to propositional functions
[Russell, by Hanna]
|
18124
|
Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
13365
|
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox
[Priest,G on Russell]
|
10711
|
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing
[Potter on Russell]
|
9127
|
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property
[Russell, by Sorensen]
|
7531
|
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert
[Russell]
|
21558
|
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class
[Russell]
|
21559
|
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are)
[Russell]
|
6343
|
For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond
[Horwich on Russell]
|
7534
|
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist
[Russell, by Monk]
|
7545
|
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed
[Russell]
|
7546
|
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation
[Russell]
|
7547
|
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles
[Russell]
|
7548
|
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions
[Russell]
|
7549
|
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist
[Russell]
|
7550
|
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds
[Russell]
|
7551
|
Matter is a logical construction
[Russell]
|
7552
|
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space
[Russell]
|
7553
|
Sense-data are purely physical
[Russell]
|
14327
|
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other
[Russell, by Mumford]
|
16045
|
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them
[Russell, by Bennett,K]
|
21597
|
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false
[Russell, by Williamson]
|
9051
|
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic
[Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
|
9054
|
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language
[Russell]
|