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Full Idea
In all knowledge that can be expressed in words - with the exception of "this" and "that", and a few other such words - no genuine proper names occur, but what seem like genuine proper names are really descriptions
Gist of Idea
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that'
Source
Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy' [George Allen and Unwin 1975], p.178
A Reaction
This is the terminus of Russell's train of thought about descriptions. Suppose you point to something non-existent, like a ghost in a misty churchyard? You'd be back to the original problem of naming a non-existent!
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |