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Single Idea 7312

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Frege's introduction of 'sense' was motivated by the desire to solve three problems: the problem of bearerless names, the problem of substitution in belief contexts, and the problem of informativeness.

Gist of Idea

'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9

Book Ref

Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.67


A Reaction

A proposal which solves three problems sounds pretty good! These three problems can be used to test the counter-proposals of Russell and Kripke.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]