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Full Idea
The syntactic notion of contradiction (p and not-p) is well understood, but is no help in explaining analyticity, since "Jones is a married bachelor" is not of that syntactic form.
Gist of Idea
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction
Source
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 4.2)
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.115
A Reaction
This point is based on Quine. This means we cannot define analytic sentences as those whose denial is a contradiction, even though that seems to be true of them. Both the Kantian and the modern logical versions of analyticity are in trouble.
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |