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Full Idea
On a deflationary concept of truth, for a sentence to possess truth-conditions it is sufficient that it be disciplined by norms of correct usage, and that it possess the syntax distinctive of declarative sentences.
Gist of Idea
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax
Source
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 5.3)
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.166
A Reaction
Idea 6337 gives the basic deflationary claim. He mentions Boghossian as source of this point. So much the worse for the deflationary concept of truth, say I. What are the truth-conditions of "Truth rotates"?
Related Idea
Idea 6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |