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Full Idea
Dispositional facts are facts about what we will do, not about what we ought to do, and as such cannot capture the normativity of meaning.
Clarification
'Normativity' concerns creating and following rules
Gist of Idea
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity
Source
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.2)
Book Ref
Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.181
A Reaction
Miller is discussing language, but this raises a nice question for all behaviourist accounts of mental events. Perhaps there is a disposition to behave in a guilty way if you do something you think you shouldn't do. (Er, isn't 'guilt' a mental event?)
| 7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
| 7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
| 7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
| 7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
| 7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
| 7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
| 7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
| 7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |