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Single Idea 7367

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness ]

Full Idea

Perhaps the brain doesn't actually have to go to the trouble of "filling in" anything with "construction" - for no one is looking.

Clarification

This refers to filling in things like the blindspot in our visual field

Gist of Idea

Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 5.4)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.127


A Reaction

This a very nice point, because claims that the mind fills in in various psychological visual tests always has the presupposition of a person (or homunculus?) which is overseeing the visual experiences.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about consciousness]:

In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels]
Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels]
Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]