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Single Idea 7368
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
]
Full Idea
In the beginning there were no reasons; there were only causes. Nothing had a purpose, nothing had so much as a function; there was no teleology in the world at all. The explanation is simple: there was nothing that had interests.
Gist of Idea
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
Source
Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 7.2)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.173
A Reaction
It seems reasonable to talk of functions even if the fledgling 'interests' are unconscious, as in a leaf. Is a process leading to an end an 'interest'? What are the 'interests' of a person who is about to commit suicide?
The
24 ideas
from 'Consciousness Explained'
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7365
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Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
[Dennett]
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7366
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
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7367
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Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
[Dennett]
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7369
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Brains are essentially anticipation machines
[Dennett]
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7368
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Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
[Dennett]
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7370
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The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
[Dennett]
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7371
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All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
[Dennett]
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7372
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In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
[Dennett]
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7373
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Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
[Dennett]
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7374
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Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
[Dennett]
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7376
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We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
[Dennett]
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7379
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If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
[Dennett]
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7380
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
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7383
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The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
[Dennett]
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7381
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We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
[Dennett]
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7382
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We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
[Dennett]
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7386
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Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
[Dennett]
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7385
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People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
[Dennett]
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7384
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Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
[Dennett]
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7387
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"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
[Dennett]
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7393
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We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
[Dennett]
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7391
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We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
[Dennett]
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7394
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Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
[Dennett]
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14308
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We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier
[Dennett, by Mumford]
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