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Full Idea
It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.
Gist of Idea
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something
Source
Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)
Book Ref
'Mind and Cognition (2nd Edn)', ed/tr. Lycan,William [Blackwell 1999], p.442
A Reaction
This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.
Related Idea
Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
| 7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
| 7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
| 7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |