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Single Idea 7377

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument ]

Full Idea

It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.

Gist of Idea

Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something

Source

Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)

Book Ref

'Mind and Cognition (2nd Edn)', ed/tr. Lycan,William [Blackwell 1999], p.442


A Reaction

This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.

Related Idea

Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]


The 3 ideas from 'Epiphenomenal Qualia'

If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]