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Single Idea 7378

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument ]

Full Idea

That Mary "has all the physical information" is not readily imaginable, so no one bothers. They just imagine she knows lots and lots - perhaps everything known today - but that is just a drop in the bucket.

Gist of Idea

No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information

Source

comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.5

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.399


A Reaction

I certainly don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility that someone who really had all the physical knowledge might be able to infer the phenomenal properties of colour.


The 7 ideas with the same theme [qualia knowledge goes beyond physical knowledge]:

If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]