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Full Idea
Psychologists mean a by-product by an 'epiphenomenon', ...but the philosophical meaning is too strong: it yields a concept of no utility whatsoever. Since x has no physical effects (according to the definition), no instrument can detect it.
Gist of Idea
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
Source
Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 12.5)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.402
A Reaction
Well said! This has always been my half-formulated intuition about the claim that the mind (or anything) might be totally epiphenomenal. All a thing such as the reflection on a lake can be is irrelevant to the functioning of that specified system.
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |