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Single Idea 7379
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
]
Full Idea
Psychologists mean a by-product by an 'epiphenomenon', ...but the philosophical meaning is too strong: it yields a concept of no utility whatsoever. Since x has no physical effects (according to the definition), no instrument can detect it.
Gist of Idea
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
Source
Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 12.5)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.402
A Reaction
Well said! This has always been my half-formulated intuition about the claim that the mind (or anything) might be totally epiphenomenal. All a thing such as the reflection on a lake can be is irrelevant to the functioning of that specified system.
The
24 ideas
from 'Consciousness Explained'
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7365
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Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
[Dennett]
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7366
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
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7367
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Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
[Dennett]
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7369
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Brains are essentially anticipation machines
[Dennett]
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7368
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Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
[Dennett]
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7370
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The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
[Dennett]
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7371
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All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
[Dennett]
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7372
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In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
[Dennett]
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7373
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Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
[Dennett]
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7374
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Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
[Dennett]
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7376
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We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
[Dennett]
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7379
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If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
[Dennett]
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7380
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
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7383
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The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
[Dennett]
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7381
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We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
[Dennett]
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7382
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We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
[Dennett]
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7386
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Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
[Dennett]
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7385
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People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
[Dennett]
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7384
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Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
[Dennett]
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7387
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"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
[Dennett]
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7393
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We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
[Dennett]
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7391
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We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
[Dennett]
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7394
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Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
[Dennett]
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14308
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We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier
[Dennett, by Mumford]
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