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Single Idea 7380
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
]
Full Idea
All visual experience is composed of activities of neural circuits whose very activity is innately pleasing to us.
Gist of Idea
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
Source
Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 12.6)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.409
A Reaction
This is the nearest I can find to Dennett saying something eliminativist. It seems to beg the question of who 'us' refers to, and what is being pleased, and how it is 'pleased' by these neural circuits. The Hard Question?
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[there is no such thing as mind, only the brain]:
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5997
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Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body
[Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
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9285
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'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul'
[James]
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3131
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Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
[Quine, by Rey]
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2344
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If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
[Putnam]
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5800
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All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
[Dretske]
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3377
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Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
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7366
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
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7380
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
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4988
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Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false
[Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
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4987
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Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced
[Churchland,PM]
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4876
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Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
[Dennett]
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7656
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I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
[Dennett]
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
[Kirk,R]
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2954
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Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges
[Lockwood]
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3140
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If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
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3134
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Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
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5342
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Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser
[Flanagan]
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4609
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It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
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6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
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