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Full Idea
There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
Gist of Idea
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine
Source
comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.438
A Reaction
We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
| 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |