more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
Gist of Idea
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain?
Source
comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.439
A Reaction
In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
| 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |