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Full Idea
I speak of my view as the Causal version of functionalism, which asserts that mental states are states apt for the production of certain ranges of behaviour and, in some cases, apt for being produced by certain ranges of stimuli.
Gist of Idea
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-10
A Reaction
This effectively makes a mental state a place in a flowdiagram (and hence the mind is software). It says nothing about what qualities the mental states have which make them apt for this role. Full explanations need more than the function.
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
| 7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |