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Full Idea
I speak of my view as the Causal version of functionalism, which asserts that mental states are states apt for the production of certain ranges of behaviour and, in some cases, apt for being produced by certain ranges of stimuli.
Gist of Idea
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-10
A Reaction
This effectively makes a mental state a place in a flowdiagram (and hence the mind is software). It says nothing about what qualities the mental states have which make them apt for this role. Full explanations need more than the function.
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |