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Full Idea
If the mental is just that which plays a causal role then there is the possibility, which may even be an empirical possibility, that the causal role of tokens of the same mental type should be filled by tokens of significantly different physical types.
Clarification
'Tokens' are individual items
Gist of Idea
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-10
A Reaction
This allows for multiple realisability in a physicalist framework. Fear has the same role in all animals, but may be realised in physically different ways. I go further, and say that two mental states could differ, while playing the same role.
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |