more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Behaviourism is false, but one is not far from the truth if one defines the mind as the cause of behaviour.
Gist of Idea
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvi)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-8
A Reaction
As Putnam says, if you cut all the efferent (outgoing) nerves, you would have a mind with no behaviour at all. I would say my mind is full of stuff that never affects my behaviour. However, influencing behaviour is certainly the main function of a mind.
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |