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Full Idea
It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property.
Gist of Idea
Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property
Source
report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-7
A Reaction
It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking.
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |