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Full Idea
The manifestations of a disposition have the particularly mysterious property (metaphysically speaking) that they need not exist - which makes them rather like intentional objects.
Gist of Idea
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-7
A Reaction
His example is a brittle glass which never shatters. This problem seems to require the mention of conditional and counterfactual statements in the description of the actual world, which rather increases the workload for philosophers.
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |