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Single Idea 7437

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Consciousness and experience of qualities are often run together - a serious mistake, I think.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same

Source

David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-7


A Reaction

A difficult claim to evaluate. Can we experience redness without being conscious of it? Could there be consciousness (e.g. of concepts) which didn't involve any qualities? I suspect that qualities are more basic than intentionality or consciousness.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [the defining aspect of being conscious]:

We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho]
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]