more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
I now think, following Lycan, that my Causal theory of mentality would be strengthened (perhaps eliminating some potential counter-examples) by the addition of a teleological element.
Clarification
'Teleology' involves purpose
Gist of Idea
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xviii)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-6
A Reaction
For Lycan, see Idea 6533. Armstrong has begun to realise that merely specifying the causal role of a mental state is too thin as an explanation. Teleology widens the notion of function. I also want to know about the properties that make it possible.
Related Idea
Idea 6533 Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |