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Full Idea
I argue for the direct identification of the secondary qualities with microscopic primary qualities of physical things.
Gist of Idea
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
Source
David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xxii)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-2
A Reaction
This sounds a bit like the eliminativism which Armstrong rejects. This seems in danger of mixing questions about the nature of mental events with questions about the nature of externally perceived objects.
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |