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Single Idea 7451

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence ]

Full Idea

In the medieval view, people provided the evidence of testimony and of authority. What was lacking was the seventeenth century idea of the evidence provided by things.

Gist of Idea

Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence

Source

Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Hacking,Ian: 'The Emergence of Probability' [CUP 1975], p.32


A Reaction

A most intriguing distinction, which seems to imply a huge shift in world-view. The culmination of this is Peirce's pragmatism, in Idea 6948, of which I strongly approve.

Related Idea

Idea 6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [experiences and facts pointing towards knowledge]:

People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]