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Full Idea
The so-called Hard Problem (of qualia) appears to be one of the easiest, in comparison with the problems of short-term memory, fluid and directable attention, the awake state vs sleep, and the unity of consciousness.
Gist of Idea
The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states
Source
Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997])
Book Ref
Churchland,Paul and Patricia: 'On the Contrary: critical essays 1987-1997' [MIT 1998], p.166
A Reaction
Most of their version of the Hard Problems centre on personal identity, and the centralised co-ordination of mental events. I am inclined to agree with them. Worriers about qualia should think more about the complexity of systems of neurons.
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |