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Single Idea 7528
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
]
Full Idea
The metaphysics of Leibniz was explicitly based upon the doctrine that every proposition attributes a predicate to a subject and (what seemed to him almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a property.
Clarification
In 'the sky is blue', 'the sky' is the subject, and 'is blue' is the predicate
Gist of Idea
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
Source
Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.48
A Reaction
I think it is realised now that although predicates tend to attribute properties to things, they are far from being the same thing. See Idea 4587, for example. Russell gives us an interesting foot in the door of Leibniz's complex system.
Related Idea
Idea 4587
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
The
23 ideas
from 'My Philosophical Development'
6420
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Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy
[Russell]
|
6419
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In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism
[Russell]
|
6426
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Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it
[Russell]
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7528
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Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
[Russell]
|
6423
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We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts
[Russell]
|
6425
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Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion
[Russell]
|
6424
|
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess
[Russell]
|
6427
|
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false
[Russell]
|
6431
|
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience'
[Russell]
|
6432
|
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have
[Russell]
|
6430
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In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds
[Russell]
|
6434
|
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities
[Russell]
|
6433
|
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images
[Russell]
|
6435
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You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
|
6440
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Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals
[Russell]
|
6436
|
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience
[Russell]
|
6438
|
Complex things can be known, but not simple things
[Russell]
|
6437
|
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate
[Russell]
|
6439
|
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
[Russell]
|
6442
|
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
|
6441
|
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes
[Russell]
|
6443
|
Surprise is a criterion of error
[Russell]
|
6444
|
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
[Russell]
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