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Single Idea 7553
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
]
Full Idea
Sense-data are purely physical, and all that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them.
Gist of Idea
Sense-data are purely physical
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.138)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.138
A Reaction
Once this account of sense-data becomes fully clear, it also becomes apparent what a dualist theory it is. The mind is a cinema, I am the audience, and sense-data are the screen. There has to be a big logical gap between viewer and screen.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[what sense-data would consist of]:
22013
|
Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object
[Reinhold]
|
6483
|
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
8244
|
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
|
6462
|
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
|
6464
|
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
6463
|
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
6467
|
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
|
7549
|
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist
[Russell]
|
7553
|
Sense-data are purely physical
[Russell]
|
17642
|
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty
[Putnam]
|
6457
|
Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent
[Vesey]
|
6454
|
Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they?
[Lacey]
|
6453
|
Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects
[Lacey]
|
2775
|
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
[Dancy,J]
|
6480
|
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
|
6482
|
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
|
2713
|
Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location?
[Tye]
|