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Single Idea 7595

[filed under theme 24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights ]

Full Idea

The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights.

Gist of Idea

The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people

Source

Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights')

Book Ref

Scruton,Roger: 'A Dictionary of Political Thought' [Pan 1983], p.409


A Reaction

I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [rights that seem to belong to any living creature]:

Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck]
Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck]
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling]