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Single Idea 7613
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
]
Full Idea
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences.
Gist of Idea
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
Source
Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Reason, Truth and History' [CUP 1998], p.21
A Reaction
This seems to be building on the idea that meaning is use, and also arises from a background of pragmatism. Perhaps a concept is an acquaintance with a node in platonic space? Lots of abilities aren't concepts, so what distinguishes the concepts?
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[concepts as abilities to believe, decide and reason]:
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14792
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A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life
[Peirce]
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18975
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We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences
[James]
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12576
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Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on
[Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
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4157
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Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests
[Wittgenstein]
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12606
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Man learns the concept of the past by remembering
[Wittgenstein]
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10731
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For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world
[Geach]
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7613
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
[Putnam]
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12575
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Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
[Evans, by Peacocke]
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12614
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I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities
[Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
[Fodor]
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12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
[Fodor]
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12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
[Peacocke]
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
[Peacocke]
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
[Peacocke]
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11123
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Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11125
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The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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