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Single Idea 7618

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties ]

Full Idea

Some philosophers are so nominalistic that they would deny the existence of such entities as 'properties' altogether; but science itself does not hesitate to talk freely of properties.

Clarification

Nominalist say only particular items exist

Gist of Idea

Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them

Source

Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Putnam,Hilary: 'Reason, Truth and History' [CUP 1998], p.69

A Reaction

Maybe scientists aren't very good at ontology? They talk about forces and energy, but don't seem to know what they are. I am inclined to think that we must include properties in the working ontology of humans, but not into strict physics.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [rejection of the category of properties]:

16621 Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
4546 We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
6063 Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
7618 Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
8959 Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
3906 If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
16263 Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
7965 Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]