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Single Idea 7620
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
]
Full Idea
What the relativist fails to see is that it is a presupposition of thought itself that some kind of objective 'rightness' exists.
Gist of Idea
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
Source
Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Reason, Truth and History' [CUP 1998], p.124
A Reaction
This may be the key objection to relativism. If you have a frame of reference, is it a good one? If you have a new perspective, is it better than your old one? Is the culture you live in confused or clear-thinking? Jokes and metaphors rely on truth.
The
22 ideas
from 'Reason, Truth and History'
4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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14214
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If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory'
[Putnam, by Lewis]
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4718
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If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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7624
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The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
[Putnam]
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7610
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A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
[Putnam]
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7611
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Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
[Putnam]
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7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
[Putnam]
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7613
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
[Putnam]
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14202
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Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
[Putnam]
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14201
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Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
[Putnam]
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14206
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There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
[Putnam]
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14200
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'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
[Putnam]
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14204
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Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
[Putnam]
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14205
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The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
[Putnam]
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14203
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Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
[Putnam]
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14207
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If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
[Putnam]
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7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
[Putnam]
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7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
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7620
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Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
[Putnam]
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7623
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For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
[Putnam]
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