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Single Idea 7623
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
]
Full Idea
An ancient Greek would have said that being wise is an ethical value.
Gist of Idea
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
Source
Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Reason, Truth and History' [CUP 1998], p.132
A Reaction
This is instantly appealing, but since the Enlightenment we are under an obligation to attempt to justify absolutely everything, including the value of wisdom. I'm thinking that it only has value if it leads to eudaimonia.
The
22 ideas
from 'Reason, Truth and History'
4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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14214
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If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory'
[Putnam, by Lewis]
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4718
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If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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7624
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The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
[Putnam]
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7611
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Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
[Putnam]
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7610
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A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
[Putnam]
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7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
[Putnam]
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7613
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
[Putnam]
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14202
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Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
[Putnam]
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14201
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Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
[Putnam]
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14206
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There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
[Putnam]
|
14204
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Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
[Putnam]
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14205
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The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
[Putnam]
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14203
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Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
[Putnam]
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14207
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If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
[Putnam]
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14200
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'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
[Putnam]
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7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
[Putnam]
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7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
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7620
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Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
[Putnam]
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7623
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For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
[Putnam]
|