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Full Idea
Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
Gist of Idea
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory
Source
report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
Book Ref
Maund,Barry: 'Perception' [Acumen 2003], p.7
A Reaction
Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
| 14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
| 14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
| 14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
| 22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |
| 11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |