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Single Idea 7629

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation ]

Full Idea

My view is that we see objects 'directly' by representing them in visual experience.

Gist of Idea

We see objects 'directly' by representing them

Source

Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], Ch.8 n1)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.129


A Reaction

[Quoted by Maund] This rejects both inference in perception and sense-data, while retaining the notion of representation. It is a view which has gained a lot of support. But how can it be direct if it represents? Photographs can't do that.

Related Idea

Idea 22107 Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]


The 23 ideas with the same theme [theory that mind represents in order to perceive]:

Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas]
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]